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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ROGER L. STRADER, : Case No. 940244-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1990) provides: 
76-1-401• "Single criminal episode" defined -- Joinder 
of offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a 
different definition, "single criminal episode" means 
all conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single 
criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit 
or modify the effect of Section 77-21-31 in controlling 
the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
Emphasis added. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990) provides: 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single 
criminal episode - Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, 
the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the 
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
Ca) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of 
a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on 
the first information or indictment, 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute 
as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge 
the jury with respect to an included offense unless 
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of 
the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict 
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and 
a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
Emphasis added. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1990) provides: 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent 
prosecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or 
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, 
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(a) The subseguent prosecution is for an 
offense that was or should have been tried under 
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; 
and 
(b) The former prosecution; 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that 
necessarily required a determination inconsistent 
with a fact that must be established to secure 
conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution 
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of 
facts or in a determination that there was insufficient 
evidence to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of 
a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the 
greater offense even though the conviction for the 
lesser included offense is subsequently reversed, set 
aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution 
resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and 
that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea of 
guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of 
prosecution if the termination takes place before the 
verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, 
and takes place after a jury has been impanelled and 
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is 
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; 
or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to 
the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record 
that the termination is necessary because: 
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(i) It is physically impossible to proceed 
with the trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the 
proceeding not attributable to the state that 
would make any judgment entered upon a verdict 
reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the 
courtroom not attributable to the state makes it 
impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a 
verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire 
prevent a fair trial. 
Emphasis added. 
Rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses - To be filed in 
single court. 
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, 
complaints, citations, or informations charging 
multiple offenses, which may include violations 
of state laws, county ordinances, or municipal 
ordinances and arising from a single criminal 
episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall 
be filed in a single court that has 
jurisdiction of the charged offense with the 
highest possible penalty of all the offenses 
charged. 
(b) The offenses within the complaint, 
citation, or information may not be separated 
except by order of the court and for good cause 
shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that 
is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information 
has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged, and a 
single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the 
offenses. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to 
dismiss the remaining charges when defendant had previously pled 
4 
guilty to one of the charges arising out of the same criminal 
episode? 
Standard of review. Questions of statutory 
interpretation present questions of law reviewed for correctness. 
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). The 
underlying facts here are undisputed. 
Preserved below by pretrial "Motion to Dismiss 
Information," R. 31-3 (see hearing transcript, R. 76-127), and by 
conditional guilty plea reserving this issue, R. 41-47 (statement 
of defendant) at 41; R. 59 (Final Order). 
REASONS SUPPORTING ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument. This is 
an issue of first impression in Utah, as there is presently no 
Utah case law construing Rule 9.5. Additionally, there is 
continued confusion in the trial courts as to the applicability 
of Coolev and Sosa. The district courts now have proper 
jurisdiction over all offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode, yet the State continues to rely on these cases for the 
proposition that, despite the clear mandate of rule 9.5 and § 76-
1-402(2), lesser offenses that fall within the limited 
jurisdiction of inferior courts may be prosecuted even when 
greater offenses arise out of the same criminal episode. A 
published decision would assist the bench and bar with future 
cases that will involve this recurring issue. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On July 22, 1992 Mr. Strader was charged in Third 
Circuit Court in West Valley City with giving false information 
to a police officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 
(1990). See Citation, Defendant's Exhibit 1 (received at R. 81) 
(attached as addendum A). On September 3, 1992 Mr. Strader pled 
guilty to this charge and was sentenced. See WVC Docket No. 
921002665MC, Defendant's Exhibit 2 (received at R. 82) (attached 
as addendum B). 
On October 19, 1992, the information in the present 
case was filed, charging Mr. Strader with the same count of false 
information to a police officer and additional counts of Class A 
theft (§76-6-404) and 3rd degree possession of a controlled 
substance (§58-37-8 (2) (a) (i)) . R. 3 (docket), 11-13 (information 
dated 10/7/92). 
Mr. Strader filed a motion to dismiss the information, 
R. 31-3 3, which was heard on November 22, 1993. See transcript, 
R. 76-127. The trial court dismissed the duplicative false 
information charge,1 but refused to dismiss the remaining two 
charges, finding that the false information was not part of a 
single criminal episode with either of the other two charges. R. 
119-24 (statements from the bench), R. 34 (minute entry granting 
motion to dismiss only as to the false information charge), R. 
xIn fact, the false information charge was not bound over at 
the September 7, 1993 preliminary hearing. R. 5-6. The trial 
court's duplicative dismissal is harmless. 
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51-57 (Findings, Conclusions, and Order) (attached as addendum 
C) . 
Mr. Strader pled conditionally guilty to count III, 
possession of a controlled substance, a 3rd degree felony. R. 
41-47 (statement of defendant), 59 (final order). The court 
stayed the statutory prison sentence pending satisfactory 
completion of probation. R. 60-61. The one year jail term of 
probation was stayed pending appeal. R. 61. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court entered detailed and accurate findings 
of fact.2 See R. 51-53 (attached as addendum C). The facts are 
undisputed. The following recitation of facts roughly parallels 
the courts findings, but contains slightly greater detail and 
record cites to evidence presented at the hearing. 
On July 21st, 1992 officer Jerry Randall of the West 
Valley Police was on duty and arrested Mr. Strader for the 
instant charges. R. 83. As described by Officer Randall: 
Yeah, I observed what I thought might be a 
theft. As I was parked across the street in a parking 
lot I saw a car pull up, man get out [and] go into the 
construction site, carry something back out. He put 
that inside. That's when I moved forward to stop the 
vehicle. 
R. 87. This occurred at approximately 11 P.M. R. 88. Officer 
Randall, in his marked police car, made a traffic stop of Mr. 
2The only minor inaccuracy is that the court indicated that 
Mr. Strader's initial plea was withdrawn on May 23, 1993, when the 
correct date appears to be May 25, 1993. Compare R. 53 1[l0 with R. 
5 (docket) . This error is irrelevant to the merits of this appeal. 
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Strader and asked him for identification. R. 92. Mr. Strader 
produced no ID, but gave the officer the name "Stanley Kent 
Strader with a date of birth of 3-1-53." R. 92-93. The officer 
identified the object in the back of the car as a circular saw.3 
Mr. Strader indicated that he had picked the saw up for a friend. 
R. 93. 
A female in the car said she could get Mr. Strader's 
identification because they lived in the apartment complex there. 
R. 93-94. A man returned with a wallet with a driver license 
with the name Earl S. Nesbitt and a photograph that "appeared to 
be Mr. Strader but it was not very identifiable. Had been 
altered." R. 94. 
Officer Randall determined that he had been given false 
information and decided to place Mr. Strader under arrest. He 
was removed from the vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the 
officer's car. A check on the license plate on the vehicle 
revealed that it did not belong to that vehicle. R. 95. Officer 
Randall impounded the vehicle and found a loaded syringe4 and 
other syringes during an inventory search. R. 96-7. Mr. Strader 
later admitted that Stanley is his brother, and that the used 
syringe found in the seat belonged to him. R. 98-9 
Mr. Strader was booked on three charges: false 
information, theft, and possession of a controlled substance. R. 
3Further investigation by Officer Black revealed that the saw 
belonged to a Carl Tippetts. R. 97. 
laboratory analysis revealed the presence of methamphetamine. 
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84, 87, 99. See also Exhibit 1 (back of citation reads "The 
person gave me the name of Stanly [sic] Strader. He was book 
[sic] for this and theft and poss. of Drugs"); R. 84 (officer 
admits writing this on the back of the citation). 
As set forth above, see Statement of the Case and 
Nature of the Proceedings, Mr. Strader was charged in third 
circuit court, West Valley division with giving false information 
to a police officer and pled guilty. The instant charges were 
later brought in district court. The trial court declined to 
dismiss the information, a conditional plea was entered, and this 
appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Strader's offenses all arise out of a single criminal 
episode. The offenses occurred at the same time, with the single 
criminal objective of stealing a circular saw and avoiding getting 
caught for that offense or any others. Under Rule 9.5 and Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(2), all offenses against Mr. Strader should 
have been brought together in the district court. 
Before the instant charges were brought, Mr. Strader pled 
guilty to the false information charge which arose out of this 
episode. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1), that conviction bars 
any further prosecution for the offenses charged in this action. 
This Court should vacate the conviction and sentence, and remand 
with instructions that the information be dismissed with prejudice. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE 
INFORMATION BECAUSE MR. STRADER HAD ALREADY 
PLED TO A CHARGE ARISING FROM THE SAME 
CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
A. MR. STRADER7 S OFFENSES ARE PART OF A 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE AS DEFINED IN 
§ 76-1-401. 
The trial court based its decision to deny Mr. Strader's 
motion to dismiss primarily on its determination that the false 
information charge was not part of a single criminal episode with 
either or both of the theft and drug possession charges. The trial 
court stated: 
Now, the issue is: Does it then have a bar to 
subsequent prosecution? If I find there was in fact a 
single criminal episode in this matter, then that would 
bar the subsequent offense via the information that is 
filed in this matter. It is my finding that there was 
not a single criminal episode in this case. There was 
not a common objective of all the different offenses 
involved here. 
R. 121. See also R. 53 M3-4. 
Section 76-1-401 defines single criminal episode as "all 
conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an 
attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
There is no question that the offenses here were closely related in 
time. The stop was made immediately after Mr. Strader was seen 
leaving the construction site, Mr. Strader gave a false name and 
birth date immediately upon being asked for identification, and the 
controlled substances were found during a search incident to arrest 
and vehicle inventory search. The issue here is whether the 
10 
criminal objective of giving the false information is the same as 
that for either or both of the other offenses. 
1. Mr. Strader's Objective in Giving 
False Information was to Avoid Being 
Caught for the Other Offenses. 
With respect to the objective of the false information 
given by Mr. Strader, the trial court stated: 
I believe the difference was the difference in 
criminal objective. You have a theft which is objective 
as to taking, permanently deprive. If that be the case, 
whatever, an objecti[ve] of taking drugs has no 
indication or no nexus to the fact that he gave false 
information to a police officer. His identity for the 
purpose and the objective of giving false information to 
a police officer was not to reveal his name. For 
whatever reason, that is not before me at this time. 
There has been some speculation that the reason 
he said that is to prevent from being discovered on all 
the other criminal conduct, i.e. possession of the 
controlled substance as well as theft case, but then that 
is just speculative before me. There is no indication to 
indicate that before me at all. 
R. 123. 
The trial court takes too narrow a view of the concept of 
single criminal objective. In State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 3 9 (Utah 
App. 1990) defendant was charged with second degree murder and 
child abuse, stemming from an incident where he stabbed his live-in 
girlfriend to death and choked her seven year old son with a vacuum 
cleaner cord.5 Lopez argued the charges should have been severed. 
This court found that joinder in the first instance was proper, as 
the charges arose from a single criminal episode: 
5The homicide victim's son survived "only because of the 
'resiliency of youth.' " Id. at 42. 
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In the present case, appellant killed Cindy 
and, only minutes later, attempted to strangle Roberto. 
The evidence indicates that appellant's purpose in 
attempting to strangle Roberto was to keep Roberto from 
telling others that he had killed Cindy. These two 
events were closely related in time and incident to the 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective, namely to 
kill Cindy and avoid being caught, so as to be part of a 
single criminal episode. 
Lopez, 789 P.2d at 42. 
The facts here are directly analogous. Mr. Strader had 
just been seen leaving a construction site after hours with a 
circular saw. Upon being stopped by a police officer a minute 
later, Mr. Strader gave his brother's name rather than his own. 
His only possible purpose for doing so would be to deflect 
attention from himself and get away with the crime he had just 
committed, and avoid detection of the controlled substances in his 
automobile. 
A police computer check on his own name would have 
revealed his prior criminal history, heightened the officer's 
suspicion, and in all likelihood protracted the duration of the 
police encounter. Mr. Strader was aware of the saw he had just 
taken, as well as at least one syringe located in the automobile. 
He wanted the police encounter to end as abruptly as possible, and 
towards that end gave the officer his brother's name, R. 98. 
In Lopez, this Court declined to take such a narrow view 
of single criminal objective. It could have said the objective of 
killing the mother was to cause her death, and the objective of 
strangling her child was the separate objective of attempting to 
cause his death. Instead, this Court took a common sense look at 
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the totality of the circumstances to determine what the criminal 
objective was. Committing an offense and immediate attempts to get 
away with that offense constitute but a single criminal objective. 
The trial court's determination here is too simplistic. 
Its determination that "the purpose and objective of giving false 
information to a police officer was not to reveal his name," R. 
122-3, misses the forest for the trees. Digging a little deeper, 
the objective on not revealing his name is to avoid being caught 
for the theft and controlled substance violations. 
Other case law is in accord. In State v. Johnson, 784 
P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), defendant made a phone call to his 
girlfriend's roommate "a few hours" before an officer was shot. He 
was upset because his girlfriend was seeing another man. Defendant 
threatened 
to beat up his girlfriend's suitor, tear off his legs, 
and blow off his head and threatened he might blow up his 
girlfriend's apartment building. As defendant spoke, he 
repeatedly loaded and unloaded a gun. He claimed to have 
a rifle with a scope, a .357 magnum, and a sawed-off 
shotgun in his possession. . . . It would not be 
unreasonable for the jury to infer that defendant was 
highly agitated on the night in question and intended to 
shoot anyone -- including an officer -- who frustrated 
his activity. 
Johnson, 784 P. 2d at 1138. The Supreme Court found that the phone 
call and the officer shooting a few hours later were part of a 
single criminal episode. " [T]he phone call was the beginning of a 
string of events all closely related in time that ended with the 
shooting of Trooper Bringhurst. As such, the phone call was part 
of a single criminal episode." Id. at 1141 (footnote cite to 
§ 76-1-401 definition of single criminal episode omitted). 
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In Johnson, the Supreme Court declined to view criminal 
objective narrowly. It could have found the purpose of the phone 
call was to threaten his girlfriend's roommate or to vent his rage, 
while the purpose of firing the shotgun at the officer was to cause 
him grievous bodily harm. Instead, the Supreme Court looked at the 
totality of the circumstances and determined that the objective of 
Johnson's conduct over several hours was to injure his girlfriend's 
new suitor and anyone else who might happen to get in his way. 
In State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), defendant 
was charged with second degree murder, robbery, and forgery. The 
Utah Supreme Court found that all three offenses were part of the 
same criminal episode: 
First, the forgery occurred almost immediately after the 
robbery and homicide and hence was closely related in 
time. The fact that Germonto spent some time making 
several attempts to cash the forged check does not 
destroy the temporal proximity of the forgery to the 
other crimes. Second, the record supports a finding that 
the offenses shared a single objective, namely to obtain 
property of value from [the victim]. 
Germonto, 86 8 P. 2d at 59. The Supreme Court looked at the broader 
picture and found that all offenses, including the homicide, had an 
objective of obtaining property of value from the victim. 
In State in re R.D.S., 777 P. 2d 532, 538 (Utah App. 
1989), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1990) this Court found 
that a juvenile's actions in child kidnapping, aggravated sexual 
abuse, and homicide of a six year old girl constituted a single 
criminal episode. This Court found that seeking sexual 
gratification and avoiding detection for such actions constituted 
but a single objective. 
14 
In State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 633 (Utah 1988), the 
Supreme Court found that eight incidents of trafficking in 
controlled substances over a seven week period constituted but a 
single criminal episode. Viewed narrowly, each transaction could 
be seen as having a separate objective of selling a specified 
quantity of drugs for an agreed sum, but properly viewed under 
§ 76-1-401, the entire series of transactions must be viewed as 
having but a single criminal objective. 
In light of this controlling authority, Mr. Strader's 
offenses here constitute a single criminal episode. The trial 
court erred in concluding otherwise. 
2. The Inclusion of All Three Charges 
in One Information Here Indicates 
that the Prosecution Considers them 
to be Part of a Single Criminal 
Episode. 
The trial court's legal conclusions contain a glaring 
inconsistency. The trial court stated from the bench: 
The examination of 76-1-402, 76-1-403 as well as Rule 
9.5, it is the opinion of the court that Rule 9.5 says 
distinctly what the state attempted to do in this matter. 
If you are going to charge someone with a crime you 
charge them with the higher crime, and the court with its 
jurisdiction to do that they have alleged in their 
information, three counts[:] possession of a controlled 
substance, a felony; a false information to a p [ea]ce 
officer, Class C Misdemeanor; and the theft, a Class A 
Misdemeanor. 
R. 120. This same conclusion is contained in the court's written 
conclusions: "The County Attorney's Office by charging all three 
crimes was following rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." R. 53 Hi. 
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Rule 9.5, by its terms, only applies to situations 
involving two or more offenses arising from a single criminal 
episode. The county attorney's office, by filing all three 
offenses in a single information, made a tacit admission that these 
offenses arise from a single criminal episode. The trial court so 
recognized. Having found that the county attorney's office 
properly followed the mandate of rule 9.5, and the charges thus 
arise from a single criminal episode, the trial court inexplicably 
goes on to find that Mr. Strader is not entitled to the benefit of 
§§ 76-1-402(2) and 76-1-403(1), which preclude multiple 
prosecutions when offenses arise from a single criminal episode. 
The court cannot have it both ways. 
Mr. Strader's offenses arise from a single criminal 
episode. His motion to dismiss this second prosecution should have 
been granted. 
B. RULE 9.5, § 76-1-402(2), AND § 76-1-
403(1) BAR THE PROSECUTION OF THE 
ADDITIONAL OFFENSES AFTER MR. STRADER 
PLED GUILTY TO THE FALSE INFORMATION 
CHARGE. 
Rule 9.5 requires that offenses arising from a single 
criminal episode be brought in a single information filed in the 
court with jurisdiction over the most serious offense. Rule 9.5 
derives from § 77-35-9.5, enacted by laws of 1989, chapter 157, §8. 
To date, there is no case law construing this rule. Nevertheless, 
the language of the rule is clear and susceptible of only one 
interpretation. " 'Unambiguous language in [a] statute may not be 
16 
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.'" State v. A House 
and 1.3 7 Acres of Real Property, No. 930481, slip op. at 5 (Utah 
1994) (quoting Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per 
curiam)). The three offenses should have been charged in a single 
information, without prior prosecution of any individual charge in 
a different case. 
Section 76-1-402(2) is to the same effect. It provides 
that offenses arising out of a single criminal episode must be 
brought in a single action if (a) the offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court, and (b) the offenses are known to 
the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on 
the first information or indictment. Subsection (b) is easily met 
here -- the false information citation has inscribed on its back 
that Mr. Strader was booked for that charge, theft, and possession 
of a controlled substance. See Exhibit 1 (addendum 1, p. 2). 
Under current law, subsection (a) is always met: district 
courts in Utah have jurisdiction over all felonies, misdemeanors, 
and infractions. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5; Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3-4(1) (Supp. 1994) . This has not always been the case. See State 
v. Coolev, 575 P. 2d 693 (Utah 1978) (because misdemeanors had to be 
tried in justice or city courts, single criminal episode statutes 
were not applicable); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979) 
(same). As a result of statutory changes, these cases are 
inapplicable here. Despite their inapplicability, the State argued 
this line of cases in the trial court. R. 113, 116. These cases 
appear to be causing continuing confusion in the trial courts. 
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Here, the trial court seemed preoccupied with the jurisdictional 
limits of the West Valley City prosecutor's office, see R. 53 ^2 
(conclusions of law) and R. 119-121, despite its irrelevance. The 
only issue is whether there is a single court that has jurisdiction 
over all the offenses, and the district court clearly does. This 
Court should clarify that district courts now have jurisdiction 
over all offenses, and Cooley and Sosa may not be relied on to show 
the contrary. 
Despite the clear mandate of Rule 9.5 and § 76-1-402(2), 
Mr. Strader was subjected to multiple prosecutions for offenses 
arising from the same criminal episode. Section 76-1-403(1) (b) (ii) 
provides that a prior conviction for one offense arising out of a 
single criminal episode bars all further prosecutions for other 
offenses that may have arisen from that same criminal episode. The 
plain language of this statute requires that the information here 
be dismissed. 
In State v. Bair, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), the Supreme 
Court held that a defendant acquitted of theft and retaining a 
stolen firearm could not be prosecuted in a separate action for 
retaining other firearms found at the same time as the firearm 
which led to the acquittal. The same result must pertain here. 
The information must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The offenses charged here arise out of a single criminal 
episode which includes Mr. Strader's false information offense. 
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His conviction for that offense bars further prosecution here. 
Appellant respectfully requests that his conviction and sentence be 
vacated, with instructions that the information be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A?-fcC day of December, 1994. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DAVID P. S. MACK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this f*?H* day of 
December, 1994. , j 
Robert K. Meineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of December, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM A 
False information citation, defense exhibit 1. 
COMMf f ICIAL VEHICLE INFORMATION 
couuenctAL vi 
HA2UAJ 
COMPANV/UNIT I 
C U R T A T E 
I1YC8 
11 YES 
I I N O 
UNO 
STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN 
O THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT 
3636 S CONSTITUTION 8LVO (2/00 W ) 
WEST VALLEY CITY. UTAH 64H9 
601 533 7694 
MCI finOUFfl TUAQSflAYS 
NOA*©wGermwTVoAYs 
COURT HOURS 
MONOAY THROUGH FRIDAY 
6 00AM TO 6 00 PM 
(CLOSEO SATURDAYS SUNOAYS 4 HOLIDAYS) 
RV 
- Q 3«aDISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
3522^§UJLH WMSL, I 
REN NOTIFIED BYTHFOeURT 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE Of CONVICTION/FORFEITURE 
FINE 6USPENOEO _J 
!jAIL . SUSPENOEO 
T " 
. PLE A/F IND ING SEVERITY , 
J Q Gullly 11 Minimum 
n No Contact 
Q NolQuilly 
! Q Fo/lei led BaU ( 1 Maximum 
f l JniarmedJala 
QLO 
USE 
OL-
V WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION ANO NOTICE TO APPEAR 
m^ ^J (Usij, 
AAJfMI, 
y Apf/ 
(FtfU) 
CASE NO 
i ^ ^ > . » I I . ^ 
CITATION NO 
9J-/J&7C 
%S- * * * 
.e£04il£ (Middl*) 
V*7rt^4&~~£,*&*'' »&9 m-9/rs>\ 
m\1T j .' \Ty >v fflp&m* P P»\H& 1% F m 
0/lv«f liC«AM NO jff iyy^ p !£>-
'ktwa 10 iVMiicyColor I Wihlcta Y«u \ Vfehfcte M>U f ^ P * |Modd' 
THE ABOVE NAMED OEFENOANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOL ATI NO: 
uricoicr I 
V„. 70. A ti& yC-St&X 
? 3 ^ X 3?<Wh/ 
7-2' .&J&B& Spfding 
• Po«i No. I loitratata • 
I (3 Y M Q No 
WITHOUT ADMITTING. GUILT. I PRO0J£E TO APPEARAS OlRCCTEIUlEREIN 
w% 
MttU 
Cut 
X 
DkKtlon 
N 8 E W 
MPHOvar 
SIGNATURE J 
I CERTIFY THAT COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE 
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE ANO I KNOW OR fiEllEVE ANO SO 
ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET 
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
HAS BEEN OIRECTEO TOAl&eXR 18 THE EflOPtfl COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77719 
COMPLAINANT 
DATE "... 
^ y ^ <<j7 
. . . . . . 19 
. . _ £ £ 2 L 
COURT copy i Out Sam uDiO RIGHT INDEX 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT,. , 
Til* f^L 
ROAOCONOITIONS 
owv WET SNOW ICE . POO 
D D D D, D 
UGHT CONDITIONS _ 
DAY- DUSK OAWC UCHTfO 
:Q; O D D 
AOOACSS WHEKE VIOLATOR WAS STOPPE01 
TRAFFIC CONOJTIONS 
MOOERATE 
-UGHT Q - ; "OOSJwQ ^ S ^ . • HEAVY Q 
PASSENGERS. 
NONE I 1 MOW MANY* • i 
JUVENILE INFORMA-nnN3.EGALGUAR0IAN 
PARENTS NAME ADDRESS 
FATHER NOTIFIED Q ; MOTHER NOTIFIED 
DEFENOA^SCOMMEHTS.Q^u, •E X C lTEO QsELUGERENT Q S S . N ^ Q , N J ^ E D 
OFFICERS COMMENTS 
7 ^ ^ ^ » * * w •"*<«- ^ ^ 
MARK VIOLATORS CAR WITH 
LETTER-A-
? w 5 i i ^ •JSUP] 
OCCURRENCE DATE; • 7 - ^ / - ^ 2 L . I H B O TIME Of O C C U R . : ^ ? 5 ' & & TH«U 
-I: REPORT DATE: 7-<g /- <*£. TIME OF REPORT: ? 3 3 & DAY OF WEEK: 
BUSINESS NAME: 
CASE LOCATION: £ 3 <70S. 1 ? W ^ CTY/ST. ^  C/ UC S~ ZP Z-y/jr 9-
LOC TYPE: | / 3 1 /f****/***^ SEAT: / ^ GANG RELATED: • »ES g ] . 
N OEPT.CLASS: [ ^ 7 \^-n>C^
 / = 2 ^ REPORT QFCID [ 27?Y \ NAMsyf^a.^ ^3=^ ^ y " ASST.OFG10: ^ 7 ^ - 3 
CASE STATUS: [^2,/ \g,<r/~ /'/- <*ZSS>"SJL- I ALCOHOL RELATED: I [vES [^S 'O [DRUG RELATED: 1 5 ^ YES [""^ 
RELATED CASE NUMBERS: *7 £ ~ / £ - 2~Sr {
 / ^ <f gj - / £-g~ 2~ £L 
] ] | | [ATTEMPTED ( X T COMMITTED j STATUTC/CrO:/^,^. J*^jp ? £ ~ 9--S~&? UCR CLASSIFICATION: 
UCR TYPE OF WEAPON: HOW/WHERE ENTRY MADE: FORCED ENTRY [ |YES | [ NO 
W j STRUCTURE OCCUPANCY: | [ [ OCCUPIED | | UNOCCUPIED | | ASANOONNSD | NUMBER OF PREMISES ENTERED 
JUV. DISPOSITION: ADDITIONAL CHARGES (NOT UCR REPORTABLE) 
POLICE CFC. NO (IF YES. 0 0 SUPP.) ASSAULT INFO: UCR CIRCUMSTANCES: 
" ^ 
^ s i | | | i i | j • COMPL • VICTIM E I 365P^65i • MISSPERS • WTTNESS 
^ S^^CL^/k. FIRST- ££_£, MiOOLE- £< 
ADDRESS: ? g~ 7 S ^ ^ /f*<^£ ^-~S t~" LSI. JT£? 
STATE: <^*^ 23P: Tr? S/ f ? - *r • 5^y 
EMPLOYER / SCHOOL: &S
-
M:
 >72^- $*$r-6£f-^> 
UC # : 
N 
— * . state: PHONE #:< ) ^£^~-J/*? ?~ BUS #: 
SEX. M MALE • FEMALE AGE: 2C TO . 
RACE: <p/ ^ y , ^ HEIGHT: v5^ 7 T 0 
m ETHNIC ORIGIN: • • NON-HISPANIC W E I G H T : / ^ O TO 
DESCRIPTION: HA*R COLOR. ^ ~ EYE COLOR: J^*
 t 
G-m S £^4**^3 *-£/-< CTEO: |P< | YES Q ] NO 
UCR ARREST CHARGE: STATUTE: .f-GS&S ?*? MlS0.[>4-FgL- 1 I COUNTS: / 
UCR ARREST CHARGE: STATUTE: MISD.I | FEL. 1 1 COUNTS: 
P€R:||| |g|l • COMPL • VICTIM \ I SUSP/ARR I I MISSPERS • WITNESS 
NAME: LAST- FWST- MI00LE-
ADORESS: APARTMENT: 
STATE: ZIPy 
EMPLOYER / SCHOOL: S.S.N: 
N 
PHONE #:< BUS #: ( 
SEX: | | MALE C ] FEMALE AGE: TO 
RACE: HEIGHT: TO m 
1 ETHNIC OPIGIN: 1 j HISPANIC \ / \ NON-HISPANIC WEIGHT: TO 
DESCRIPTION: HAIR COLOR: EYE COLOR: 
~r CITED: d YES I I 
UCR ARREST CHARGE: STATUTE: MISC. 1 [FEL.1 1 COUNTS: 
] UCR ARREST CHARGE: STATUTE: MISO. 1 I F£U [ | COUNTS: 
;WEsrr;v2tfXErje^^ .v\w.<%'v\. %<$>#,/%; ' «~| PAGE 2 OF C I ] I CASE*<%2~/2* $T7£\ 
UEFW&nOH I I STOLEN L J RECVO L j STLN/REC I £ J FOUND £ ] DAMAGED I Q L O S T 
DESCRIPTION: * / ? ^ / ^ C^eS «>"H I SERIAL NUMBER: 
MAKE: MODEL: 
••^U 
E J PROPERTY TYPE: k y j T VALUE: PROPERTY DAMAGED 
STOLEN LOCATION: CITY: STATE: 
RECOVERED BY- AGENCY: OFC: La: DATE/TIME: VALUE: 
RECOVERED LOCATION: CJTY: STATE: 
/l£i~*?£'f LD.: g V ^ ^ ENT.NCIC Q ] YES Q NO | REM. NClC Q YES • NO CONTROL OFFICER: 
VEHDESC: 7?\s7^ STATE VEK TYPE: [ < £ ? / [ £&***-£? YEAR: , 7 g^ 
MAKE: 1 ^ ^ U?»./>*~v MODEL: /£><?'& STYLE: \C?57?\ ^ £? COLOR: j ^ ^ - [ , / £ ^ 
1 
C 
[L 
IE 
UCENSE#:
 9 7 7 ^ 0 &£> STATE: ^ / " v"***-
VEH. DAMAGE: DAMAGE/STOLEN VALUE: 
DEPOSITION: 1 / ^ j , „ ^ , ^ 
STOLEN LOCATION: CITY/ST/2JP* 
# - I RECOVERED BY OFFICER / ID: DATE TIME- VALUE: 
0 j I RECOVERED LOCATION: CITY/ST/23P: 
RECOVERY CODE: ENT. N C l C r H Y E S ^ J N 0 REM. NClC j | YES | | NO OWNER NOTIFIED: [ " " " V E S P ^ N O 
AfFnAVfTOFIHeT Secoon'To^KA FaJwsljf reporting oftens* or. accusing 
subject Apor»m»Bgu^^aclw«Hini»dewj»a^or^J>«: {1} toowinx^- ; 
flww» or cause© to octjvontafew information to any few-ertorcsment ofTrcer 
w<rt a purpose of xxsuanglfto officeFto believe mat enotner haa committed 
art offense: oc (2) knowingly g*es or caoses to fie given Inf ormattort to any 
law erfutuaner* ameer concerning me commission of an offense* knowing 
marine offense rftl not occur or icnowing tnat he has no Information relating 
tains offense or Hanger* 1 , <• " "  
3 nerecYceroTymatlftave rood Ihe Ioregoing*inaM. am mo {owner^cwoBra
 v 
agent) otthe-aoove oeaiuitjeu property and *>r vara c f * and «wr tnformaOoTt 
sftowrrjstnje and cemxttotne best ot an/,bettef and knowledge:Iftarf wU{, 
assistJn me prosecudon of me person or persons arrested for 1fteft of tnls. 
property and or vehicle. 
Signature: Witness/Officer: 
NARRATIVE:(Cs^c S*,~,~~L< — TV*-? / J <*. <~ <y* <~ ^ - ^ > £ ^ » 
...Z..<? T:* ^.../f.<y... ^ 
Cjk.£.C- £*.&*&£.£* ^fl?..J77^~.hf^.^J?^ £TVf?.f/^£r .^T^TTV^r..-^.. 
(&?A£&. ~£i4. ?&... ./?. .-?.r.?.rs% .^ ??W .TTfT ^ rfT fr*.A~. ^VJF. <?. f?r*. c f?r? *?L -C.... 
S ^.*^A/, JC^iy.^:. £/£:.<^*f?f?r. .?..T.<r.^ 7.^ .. .. -^...^r-^fr: f^rr.^. - ^ . . . 
* /S -<z TT^-7*^.. A£-r ^lS-£\*<. f'rr.f..*r S..^Z^m^f!>^r *~.sf. 
C&*5 tc ^& f/^^<^...~.^/yS^ fr^ps- /p<r&£* —rT......*.^\..../r*'.Sr.<<L ... 
...f.£?. 4:.. ?2 ~JJ*.7.<CeJ..A*x?J. * / > * . .7T^*-Of-. . *7Ar../.<R.*-*rS... 
.../Z Sfv ^ ^ Z . - . / £ ff^SrJ2 - ^ ^ . . . ^ ^ ^ < : /6f ^ - 2 - / ^ ? ^ - ^ ^ 
-A*3- .~/*"^:~* l/s., 
<£% ^ < ^ l^f'5 ; > 
AOD'L FORMS £ QUANTITY; WIT STMT PERS: CONT: OFC ASSLT: SHORT FORM* n Y E S f t NO 
VEH SUPP: CITATION: QUI. MERCHANT SHOPUFT FORM: BLUE JUV. DOCKET: TAPED NARR? [ ^ YES [""1 NO 
SGT/JD: RECOROS/O: VECC/JD: 
ADDENDUM B 
West Valley City Docket, No. 921002665MC, defense 
exhibit 2. 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
Defendant Citation: 
D O C K E T Page 1 
WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 
4:37 PM 
C204816 WVP Case: 921002665 MC 
Agency No.: WVP 
STRADER, ROGER LEE 
3878 W ROCKWOOD WAY #50 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
City Misdemeanor 
Judge: 
DEFENDANTS 
[BIT -\-m 
NO OTN # FOR THIS CASE 
Charges 
Violation Date: 07/21/92 
1. FALSE PERSONAL INFO TO P/O 
Sev: MC 
2. WARRANT OF ARREST FEE 
Sev: 
76-8-507 
WARRANT FEE 
Bail 
100.00 
70.00 
Proceedings 
07/22/92 Case filed on 07/22/92. JLB 
07/23/92 FILED BOND - BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS LIB 
08/04/92 ARR scheduled for 8/ 7/92 at 9:00 A in room 3 with TEM SLB 
08/07/92 Mis Arraignment JUDGE: MEDLEY, TYRONE E. CAC 
TAPE: 10153 COUNT: 1810 CAC 
ATD: None Present PRO: None Present CAC 
Deft is present CAC 
Deft advised of rights CAC 
PTC scheduled for 09/03/92 at 1000 A in room 3 with TEM CAC 
Chrg: 76-8-507 Plea: Not Guilty CAC 
08/14/92 FILED: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL - J SCOTT C0TTINGHAM PAW 
09/03/92 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE) : JUDGE: MEDLEY, TYRONE E. CAC 
TAPE: 10227 COUNT: 1572 CAC 
Deft Present CAC 
ATD: C0TTINGHAM, SCOTT PRO: ST0NEY, KEITH CAC 
DPWC. DEF COP. DEF ADVISED OF RIGHTS - WAIVED. CAC 
Chrg: 76-8-507 Find: Guilty Plea CAC 
Chrg: FALSE I.D. TO PO Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty Plea CAC 
Fine Amount: 50.00 Suspended: .00 CAC 
Jail: 10 DAYS Suspended: 10 DAYS CAC 
Fines and assessments entered: FN 37.04 CAC 
SL 12.96 CAC 
Total fines and assessments..: 50.00 CAC 
CREATE Trust A/R # 01 Attorney Fee - City 100.00 CAC 
C/O JAIL SUSPENDED ON TIMELY PAYMENT OF FINE & FEES CAC 
Began tracking Fine Stay Review on 12/03/92 CAC 
09/08/92 FILED: NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL, LARSEN, EDDINGTON & IHR 
COTTINGHAM IHR 
01/14/93 TEM/RN DEF FTP FINE. C/O BW FOR $150.00 + WR FEE. RLN 
Ended tracking of Fine Stay RLN 
Warrant ordered RLN 
Warrant printed RLN 
01/19/93 Warrant order updated RLN 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
Defendant Citation: 
STRADER, ROGER LEE 
D O C K E T 
C204816 
Page 2 
WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 
4:37 PM 
WVP Case: 921002665 MC 
Agency No.: WVP 
City Misdemeanor 
01/19/93 Warrant printed 
BENCH WARRANT batch issued - JUDGE TEM 
Failure to pay fine or post bail 
Bail amount ordered: 150.00 
Warrant fee: 70.00 
Added WARRANT FEE to charge list. 
05/11/93 Warrant recalled on 05/11/93 because Booked 
05/17/93 FILED BOND $220 BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS 
05/20/93 HRG scheduled for 5/20/93 at 8:31 A 
Hearing: JUDGE: T 
TAPE: 10913 COUNT: 3323 
Deft Present 
ATD: None Present PRO: None Present 
REV scheduled for 05/25/93 at 0200 P in room 3 with TM 
DPWOC. ON DEF MOTION C/O CASE SET FOR REVIEW 
05/25/93 Hearing (REVIEW HEARING) : JUDGE: ROBERT W. DAINES 
TAPE: 10931 COUNT: 0420 
Deft Present 
ATD: None Present PRO: None Present 
REV scheduled for 07/06/93 at 0200 P in room 3 with TM 
DPWC. PRELIMINARY HEARING ON ANOTHER MATTER RESET, THIS CASE 
SET ON SAME CALENDAR. 
07/06/93 Bench Warrant Hearing: 
Bench Warrant Authorization requested by the Court 
DEF FTA REVIEW C/O BW $300.00 
Warrant ordered 
07/07/93 Warrant printed 
07/15/93 BENCH WARRANT batch issued - JUDGE TM Issued - 07/15/93 
Failure to appear for hearing 
Bail amount ordered: 300.00 
Warrant fee: 
07/21/93 Warrant recalled on 07/21/93 because Booked 
07/22/93 HRG scheduled for 7/22/93 at 8:32 A in room 3 with TM 
Hearing: JUDGE: T. PATRICK CASEY 
TAPE: 11052 COUNT: 1626 
Deft Present 
ATD: COTTINGHAM, J SCOTT PRO: None Present 
CUSTODY: Own Recognizance 
DPWOC IN CUSTODY. C/O CTS FOR FINE, ATTY FEE IN AMOUNT OF $100 
DUE 10/22/93 
Began tracking Fine Stay Review on 10/22/93 
Issued - 01/19/93 
in room 3 with TM 
PATRICK CASEY 
RLN 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
LJB 
LIB 
DHR 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
JLS 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
LJB 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
CAC 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
Defendant Citation: 
STRADER, ROGER LEE 
D O C K E T Page 3 
WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 
4:37 PM 
C204816 WVP Case: 921002665 MC 
Agency No.: WVP 
City Misdemeanor 
Accounting* Summary 
Fine Due 
Total Due 
120.00 
Paid Credit 
A/R Type: 
Attorney Fee #01 
Additional Case Data 
Total Due 
100.00 
Received 
Balance 
120.00 
Paid 
Time Pay# 
Balance 
100.00 
Sentence Summary 
1. FALSE I.D. TO PO 
Fine amount: 
Jail: 10 DA 
2. WARRANT FEE 
Plea: Not Guilty 
50.00 Suspended: 
Suspended: 10 DA 
Plea: 
.00 
Find: Guilty Plea 
Find: 
Parties 
Atty for Defendant 
COTTINGHAM, J SCOTT 
270 HARMON BUILDING 
3540 SOUTH 4000 WEST 
WEST VALLY CITY UT 84120 
Home Phone: ( ) 
WorJc Phone: ( ) 
Payee 
SCOTT COTTINGHAM 
/ 01 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 09/04/54 
Dr. Lie. No.: 0 
Scheduled Hearing Summary 
ARRAIGNMENT 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
HEARING 
REVIEW HEARING 
REVIEW HEARING 
HEARING 
Tracking Status 
State: UT Expires: 
on 08/07/92 
on 09/03/92 
on 05/20/93 
on 05/25/93 
on 07/06/93 
on 07/22/93 
0900 
1000 
0831 
0200 
0200 
0832 
A 
A 
A 
P 
P 
A 
in 
in 
in 
in 
in 
in 
room 
room 
room 
room 
room 
room 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
with 
with 
with 
with 
with 
with 
TEM 
TEM 
TM 
TM 
TM 
TM 
Fine Stay 
Review Date 
10/22/93 
End of the docket report for this case. 
ADDENDUM C 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 
51-57) 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Room #S37Q0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROGERL.STRADER, 
Defendant. 
This matter having come before this Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and the Court having heard the arguments made by counsel, the Court now hereby makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 21, 1992 at 3390 South 3900 West Officer Randall of the West 
Valley Police Department observed the defendant leaving a construction site at 11:00 p.m. with 
something in his hand. 
2. Officer Randall observed the defendant enter his car with the object and drive 
away. Officer Randall initiated a stop of the defendants car and requested identification from the 
defendant. The defendant was unable to give the officer any identification but verbally identified 
himself as Stanley Kent Strader with a date of birth of 3/1/53. A passenger in the vehicle 
volunteered to obtain the defendant's identification. An individual named Tony Ochoa returned 
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and provided the officer with a wallet which was represented as the defendant's. The wallet 
contained a drivers license which had been altered. The name on the license was Earl S. Nesbitt. 
3. While the officer was talking with the defendant he noticed a saw on the back seat 
of the defendant's car. The officer asked the defendant about the saw and the defendant told the 
officer the defendant was picking the saw up for a friend. 
4. The defendant was placed under arrest by Officer Randall for False Identification 
to a Police Officer, a Class C Misdemeanor, and the officer filled out a citation with this charge 
on it. 
5. The officer ran a check on the license plate on the defendant's vehicle and it was 
registered to another car. The officer determined to impound the vehicle. 
6. Officer Randall began to search the vehicle incident to the arrest of the defendant 
and the impound of the vehicle. During this search the officer found several syringes in the 
glove compartment of the car and a syringe which was full of a substance on the driver's side 
floor. The officer called for a canine unit to finish the search of the car. The canine unit 
recovered an additional syringe with liquid in it that was hidden under the seat cover of the 
vehicle. 
7. The defendant was transported to the West Valley Police Department where he 
was mirandized and questioned by Officer Randall. The defendant admitted that the syringe 
which had been recovered from the seat of the car was his. 
8. The defendant was transported to the Salt Lake County Jail and booked into jail 
for False Identification to a Police Officer, a Class C Misdemeanor; Theft, a Class A 
Misdemeanor and Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony. 
9. On July 22, 1992 the False Identification to a Police Officer charge was filed in 
the West Valley Circuit Court. The defendant was arraigned on August 7, 1992 and the 
defendant entered a not guilty plea. On September 3, 1992 the defendant, represented by 
counsel, entered a guilty plea to this charge in West Valley Circuit Court. The case was 
prosecuted by the West Valley City Prosecutors Office. 
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10. On October 19, 1992 the charges of Theft, False Identification to a Police Officer, 
and Possession of a Controlled Substance were filed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
On February 23, 1993 the defendant, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to an amended 
charge of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, and Theft, a 
Class A Misdemeanor. The False Identification to a Police Officer charge was dismissed. The 
defendant withdrew his guilty pleas on May 23, 1993. A preliminary hearing was held on 
September 7, 1993 and the defendant was bound over to the Third District Court on the theft and 
the possession charges. The false information charge was dismissed by the circuit court as 
defendant had previously entered a guilty plea on that charge. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The County Attorney's Office by charging all three crimes was following rule 9.5 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2. The West Valley City Prosecutors Office did not have jurisdiction over the Class 
A Theft charge or the Third Degree Felony Possession of a Controlled Substance charge and 
could not prosecute these charges. It did have jurisdiction over the Class C Misdemeanor False 
Identification to a Police Officer charge. 
3. The defendant gave the false name to the police officer before the drugs were 
discovered and before the theft had been confirmed. The defendant, by giving a false name may 
have been trying to escape apprehension by the officer but this action did not have the same 
criminal objective and was not related to the theft or the possession of drugs. 
4. The false identification to a police officer, theft and possession of a controlled 
substance charges were not part of a single criminal episode as defined by §76-1-401, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. There was not a single criminal objective and they are different 
statutes, have different elements, would be prosecuted by different jurisdictions and have 
different penalties. 
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5. The Defendants Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED this J ^ ^ d a y of /^^fl^e4f- , 1994. 
BY THE. 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
~XyJ\P^ h < / \ M A L - ^ -
DAVID P.S. MACK 
Counsel for Defendant 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Room #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
Mitt ! « * 
oev*xic*t% 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROGERL.STRADER, 
Defendant. 
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The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact 
and the Conclusion of Law based thereon; 
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED this ( day of / ^ f ? < ^ f r * - , 1994. 
BY THE CetJRT: 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Third District Court Judge 
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CgRXIFICATE OF PELTRY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law and the Order were delivered to David P.S. Mack, counsel for Defendant 
ROGER L. STRADER, by placing the contents thereof in the Salt Lake Legal Defender courier 
box located within our office this / day o f ^ l ^ ^ / ^ ? , 1994. 
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